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SETTING THE PACE FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY: 
THE RISE, FALL, AND (POTENTIAL) RETURN OF 
PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Note discusses an innovative form of legislation known as 
“Property Assessed Clean Energy”, or PACE. PACE allows property 
owners to receive funding from their municipality for the purpose of 
energy efficiency improvements.
1
 This money is recovered by the 
municipality in the form of a special assessment that runs with the 
property, amortized over a period of ten to twenty years.
2
 This financing 
mechanism has two key advantages that make it an effective tool for 
encouraging homeowners to make their homes more energy efficient. 
First, there is no dauntingly high initial net capital outlay required on the 
part of the property owner.
3
 Second, since the assessment runs with the 
property,
4
 property owners pay only for the benefit they derive from the 
energy efficiency improvements, and no more, in the event that they move 
before full cost recovery is made by the municipality.
5
 As these are the 
two most cited barriers to implementing energy efficiency improvements,
6
 
PACE has the potential to spur a wave of energy efficiency retrofits 
throughout the country. Indeed, until recently, this scenario appeared 
likely as state after state enacted PACE legislation.
7
 
In the summer of 2010, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)8 moved to quash residential PACE.9 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.  
 2. See infra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 7. The following states, as well as the District of Columbia, have passed PACE legislation at the 
time of this writing: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachussetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. See PACENOW, http://pacenow.org/blog/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). It is notable that both 
Democratic and Republican-controlled states have passed PACE-enabling legislation. Id. Indeed, 
PACE has thus far enjoyed broad, bipartisan support. See discussion infra notes 115–19. For examples 
of PACE-enabling legislation, see infra notes 26–29. 
 8. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the colloquial names for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, respectively. Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) that were chartered by the federal government 
for the purpose of providing stability to the secondary market for residential mortgages and to promote 
access to mortgage credit. See, e.g., Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1451–1459 (2006) (establishing Freddie Mac). The GSEs are regulated by the FHFA, which was 
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Specifically, the FHFA believes that PACE creates unacceptable risk for 
lenders in general and its regulated entities in particular because most 
PACE legislation gives PACE assessment liens priority over pre-existing 
mortgages in the event of homeowner default.
10
 Thus, citing “safety and 
soundness concerns,” the FHFA directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
refrain from purchasing mortgages secured by properties encumbered by 
PACE liens.
11
 As Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac own or guarantee over half 
of all residential mortgages in the United States,
12
 this action effectively 
killed residential PACE programs throughout the country.
13
 However, as 
discussed in detail below, this action arguably violated both the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”).14 
This Note will both address this recent conflict in detail and propose 
possible solutions. Part II of this Note will provide a detailed overview of 
PACE and its recent history. Part III will then examine the recent actions 
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHFA in a critical light, arguing that 
these entities’ actions are ultimately counterproductive. Part IV of this 
Note will then discuss potential solutions to the conflict, including both 
legislative and judicial resolutions. Finally, Part V will discuss the future 
of PACE. 
PACE is a promising, common-sense program that could enable 
homeowners to do their part to combat climate change and reduce the 
United States’ dependence on fossil fuels. The actions of Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the FHFA in shutting down PACE exhibited rash, 
reactionary decision-making. This Note will make the case that PACE 
legislation can be structured so that lenders and loan servicers do not take 
on undue risk, while still providing homeowners with the means to reduce 
the energy consumption footprint of their homes. 
 
 
created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. See 
also infra note 65. 
 9. See discussion infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text. The FHFA’s actions had no effect 
on commercial PACE financing, as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase only residential loans. 
Commercial PACE programs have continued apace, unaffected by the actions of the FHFA and its 
regulated entities. Eric Bloom, Where Does PACE Financing Stand Today?, MATTER NETWORK (Aug. 
7, 2011), http://www.matternetwork.com/2011/8/where-does-pace-financing-stand.cfm. 
 10. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 12. Simon Atkinson, US Rescues Giant Mortgage Lenders, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2008, 12:24 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7505152.stm. 
 13. John McChesney, Outlook Dims for Popular Energy-Efficiency Loans, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(July 29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128700648&sc=tw. 
 14. See infra notes 124–94 and accompanying text. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF PACE AND ITS RECENT HISTORY 
Concerns about climate change and future energy shortfalls have 
spurred energy conservation and efficiency initiatives at a rate not seen 
since the 1970s oil-shortage crisis.
15
 Both private and state actors are 
moving to facilitate, encourage, and in some cases, require energy 
conservation measures.
16
 While lasting and long-term solutions to climate 
change and future energy shortfalls will likely entail a major overhaul of 
the global energy economy, simpler and more easily implemented steps 
can be taken in the short-term to ease this transition. Specifically, energy 
efficiency measures, often described as the “low-hanging fruit” of 
potential energy conservation efforts, can offer dramatic results in terms of 
reducing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions (“GHG”) through the 
application of commonly available technology and techniques.
17
  
Simple home energy efficiency retrofits can help homeowners 
significantly reduce their utility bills while at the same time reducing GHG 
emissions and energy use.
18
 Energy efficiency initiatives can also serve to 
stimulate the economy through the creation of “green” jobs.19 However, 
 
 
 15. For example, the private clean technology (or “cleantech”) industry is expanding rapidly. The 
global wind, solar, and biofuels industries’ revenue, which collectively reached $144.5 billion in 2009, 
is projected to grow to $343.5 billion in the next decade. See RON PERNICK ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY 
TRENDS 2010: APRIL 2010 UPDATE, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.cleanedge.com/reports/pdf/ 
Trends2010.pdf. 
 16. For an overview of various energy conservation policy initiatives implemented by the states, 
see DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2012). Perhaps the most widespread example of these policy initiatives are renewable 
portfolio standards, which require investor-owned utilities to generate a certain percentage of their 
electricity from renewable resources, as defined by statute. For an example of such a statute, see MO. 
STAT. ANN. § 393.1030 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (requiring no less than 15 percent by 2021). 
 17. See, e.g., Jeff Civins et al., Environmental Due Diligence—Counting Carbon, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 2009, at 37, 40. Common energy efficiency improvements include 
installing adequate insulation, programmable thermostats, solar panels and solar-powered heat pumps, 
and replacing old appliances with new, energy efficient models. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY 
SAVERS BOOKLET: TIPS ON SAVING ENERGY & MONEY AT HOME (2009), available at http://www1 
.eere.energy.gov/consumer/tips/pdfs/energy_savers.pdf. 
 18. Older homes are particularly energy inefficient. It is estimated that “if all pre-2000 homes 
were brought up to the same efficiency level as post-2000 homes . . . overall residential energy 
consumption would fall by an additional 22.5 percent.” JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD 
UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2010, at 31 (2010), available at http://www.jchs 
.harvard.edu/research/publications/state-nations-housing-2010. 
 19. One report shows that there are currently approximately 770,000 clean energy jobs in the 
United States, and that jobs in this sector have grown at a rate of 9.1 percent, as compared to 3.7 
percent for jobs overall during the study timeframe. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE CLEAN ENERGY 
ECONOMY: REPOWERING JOBS, BUSINESSES AND INVESTMENTS ACROSS AMERICA 8, 14 (2009), 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Clean_Economy_Report_Web.pdf. It 
has also been projected that green jobs could continue to increase at a rate of over 5.5 percent per year, 
with 4.2 million such jobs being generated in the United States over the next thirty years; this could 
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many homeowners are reluctant to take such measures due to the requisite 
initial net capital outlay and the relatively long period of time required to 
recoup this cost.
20
 Some homeowners are unable to afford these upfront 
costs, while others may be unwilling to make this long-term investment if 
they believe they may sell the property before their energy efficiency 
investments result in a net gain. Policymakers in all levels of government 
can do much to incentivize homeowners to nevertheless take the plunge 
and retrofit their homes for increased energy efficiency. While a wide 
variety of such policies and laws have been enacted throughout the United 
States,
21
 this Note will focus on PACE and its implementation throughout 
the country. 
PACE is a popular and innovative solution to obstacles preventing the 
widespread implementation of energy efficiency measures. Originating in 
California in 2007,
22
 PACE is a form of legislation that allows 
municipalities to create special assessment districts for the purpose of 
financing homeowners’ upfront costs for energy efficiency 
improvements.
23
 Many states already have statutes in place that allow 
municipalities to create assessment districts for the purpose of improving 
local infrastructure.
24
 Under such a statute, for example, a city may issue 
 
 
account for 10 percent of new job growth during this period. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. 
METRO ECONOMIES: CURRENT AND POTENTIAL GREEN JOBS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 17 (2008), 
available at http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/greenjobsreport.pdf; see also DEUTSCHE 
BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, UNITED STATES BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY RETROFITS: 
MARKET SIZING AND FINANCING MODELS 7 (2012), available at http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/ 
_media/Building_Retrofit_Paper.pdf (finding that energy efficiency retrofits in the United States could 
result in the mitigation of 600 million metric tons of CO2, more than $1 trillion in energy savings over 
ten years, and up to 3.3 million new cumulative job years). 
 20. Retrofits can cost anywhere from an average of $2,500 for basic home weatherization to over 
$70,000 for photovoltaic solar panel systems. Joshua G. Bassett, Cost-Effective Renovations and Other 
Improvements for Creating More Energy Efficient Homes, STUDENT PULSE (Oct. 29, 2009), http:// 
www.studentpulse.com/articles/23/cost-effective-renovations-and-other-improvements-for-creating-
more-energy-efficient-homes.  
 21. For a broad overview of the types of policies that have been implemented to incentivize 
energy efficiency, see supra note 16. 
 22. Cisco DeVries, How Innovative Financing is Changing Energy in America, GRIST (Jan. 27, 
2010, 3:37 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-01-26-how-innovative-financing-is-changing-energy-
in-america. 
 23. Ryan North et al., The Evolving Picture of Energy Efficiency Retrofitting for New York City 
Commercial Buildings, in GREEN REAL ESTATE SUMMIT 2010: WHAT ATTORNEYS, DEVELOPERS, 
REGULATORS, TENANTS & LENDERS NEED TO KNOW 53–54 (2010). 
 24. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53311–53368.3 (West 1997 & Supp. 2012); CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE §§ 26500–26654 (West 1997) (relating to geologic hazard abatement districts); Improvement 
Act of 1911, CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 5000–6794 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); Mello-Roos 
Community Facilities Act of 1982, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-20-601 through 30-20-628 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2011); Consolidated Local Improvements Law, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271.010–
271.850 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 223.001–223.950 (West 2009 & Supp. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/4
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bonds for the purpose of financing sewer lines in a given area. The bonds 
are repaid through property assessments by property owners who benefit 
from the improvement.
25
 PACE legislation typically expands the language 
of this type of statute to include energy efficiency improvements within its 
ambit.
26
 The legislation also generally provides that local governments 
may prescribe the types of energy efficiency improvements that the 
municipality will be willing to finance,
27
 as well as underwriting standards 
for the program.
28
 Finally, in the vast majority of states that have enacted 
PACE programs, PACE legislation provides that a first priority lien will 
be placed on the property in the event of default or delinquency on the part 
of the homeowner in paying the special assessment.
29
 
In a typical PACE scenario, a municipality first sells bonds to raise 
starting capital for energy efficiency project financing.
30
 Then, a 
homeowner seeking to finance energy efficiency improvements to her 
home applies to the city for the financing.
31
 Assuming the applicant shows 
that she will be able to pay the special assessment by meeting designated 
underwriting criteria, the municipality then finances approved energy 
efficiency projects.
32
 The municipality recovers this cost and pays back the 
bonds by placing a special assessment on the property for a period of time 
equal to or less than the lifetime of the energy efficiency improvements 
made to the property, typically no more than twenty years.
33
 
 
 
2011). 
 25. See North et al., supra note 23, at 53. 
 26. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.12(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012). For an example 
of PACE legislation in a state that lacked the special assessment framework prior to PACE being 
enacted, see MO. STAT. ANN. §§ 67.2800–67.2835 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).  
 27. See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.20(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012). 
 28. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3262 (West Supp. 2011). 
 29. See, e.g., MO. STAT. ANN. § 67.2815.5 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011). For PACE programs to be 
viable, the lien must be senior to pre-existing mortgages, as there would be little to no interest among 
bond buyers if the liens were junior, meaning municipalities would have no way to finance the upfront 
costs of the energy efficiency retrofits. Furthermore, subordinate PACE liens would be impractical for 
local government officials to administer. See Letter from Chris Moriarty, Director, Barclays Capital, 
and John Rhow, Senior Vice President, Barclays Capital, to Jeffrey Tannenbaum, Fir Tree Partners 
(Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://pacenow.org/documents/Pace%20letter%20sept%202009%20re% 
20liens%20_2_%20_2_%20-%20Barclays%20%209-14-09%20_3_.pdf. 
 30. NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL ET AL., PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (“PACE”) 
PROGRAMS WHITE PAPER: HELPING ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ENERGY 
INDEPENDENCE, IMPROVING HOMEOWNER CASH FLOW AND CREDIT PROFILE, PROTECTING 
MORTGAGE LENDERS, AND CREATING JOBS 12 (2010) [hereinafter PACE WHITE PAPER].  
 31. Id. at 10. 
 32. Id. at 10–11. 
 33. Id. at 11; see also Berkeley FIRST: Financing Initiative for Renewable and Solar 
Technology, CITY OF BERKELEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=26580 (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2012) (detailing Berkeley’s PACE program). 
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PACE legislation allows property owners to reap the benefits of energy 
efficiency improvements while minimizing or eliminating the usual 
barriers to implementation.
34
 Since the municipality provides the initial 
funding, there is no initial outlay of capital on the part of the homeowner.
35
 
And since the special assessment attaches to and runs with the property 
rather than the homeowner, a homeowner is not penalized if she moves 
before the energy efficiency investments result in an overall net gain; 
instead, the homeowner merely pays for the benefit she derives and no 
more.
36
 The next owner of the property continues to enjoy the benefits of 
energy efficiency while paying their proportionate share of the costs, 
depending on how long they own the property.
37
 Moreover, PACE 
programs are generally designed so that the homeowners’ savings in the 
form of utility bill reductions will be greater than the amount the 
homeowners pay the city through the special assessment; that is, the 
Savings-to-Investment ratio is greater than one.
38
 PACE programs 
therefore make energy efficiency improvements a winning proposition for 
both homeowners and municipalities. 
Berkeley, California, was the first municipality to institute a PACE 
program in 2007.
39
 In 2008 California became the first state to enable 
municipalities to implement PACE programs more easily by passing A.B. 
811.
40
 The program has enjoyed great success in California, with at least 
seven local governments instituting a PACE program.
41
 Initial feedback 
from these programs indicates that homeowner demand for PACE funding 
is high,
42
 and the programs may be helping to spur job growth.
43
 
 
 
 34. See Christopher Mims, The No-Money-Down Solar Plan, SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 2009, at 50–
51, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=world-changing-ideas. 
 35. See PACE WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 12–13. 
 36. Id. 
 37. This ignores the inherent misalignment of interests in a landlord-tenant relationship, where 
the landlord has little incentive to pay for energy efficiency improvements that will primarily benefit 
tenants. That problem is beyond the scope of this Note. However, from an economic perspective, a 
landlord may be able to demand greater rent from a tenant if that tenant pays less for utilities. 
 38. See infra note 48.  
 39. See supra note 33. 
 40. A.B. 811, 2007–2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
 41. These include the cities of Berkeley, Palm Desert, Yucaipa, and San Francisco, and the 
counties of Sonoma, San Diego, and Western Riverside. See generally PACENOW, supra note 7. 
 42. For example, the Sonoma County PACE program received over 10,000 inquiries from 
interested homeowners, and roughly 600 energy efficiency projects were financed by the county in the 
program’s first nine months. HOME PERFORMANCE RES. CTR., CASE STUDY: SONOMA COUNTY 
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE PROGRAM 4–5 (2010) [hereinafter CASE STUDY: SONOMA COUNTY], 
available at http://www.hprcenter.org/sites/default/files/ec_pro/hprcenter/best_practices_case_study_ 
sonoma.pdf. The Palm Desert program had funded some 220 projects as of March 2010. HOME 
PERFORMANCE RES. CTR., CASE STUDY: PALM DESERT, CALIFORNIA 2 (2010), available at http:// 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/4
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Based on this remarkable initial success in California, PACE began 
spreading across the nation.
44
 The federal government quickly took note of 
the potential of the program for both encouraging energy conservation as 
well as stimulating the economy. In October 2009 the Vice President’s 
Middle Class Task Force and the White House Council on Environmental 
Quality (“CEQ”) released a report entitled “Recovery Through Retrofit” 
explicitly endorsing PACE legislation.
45
 This report both recommended 
that additional funding be made available for PACE programs through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”)46 and enunciated 
working principles for energy efficiency programs like PACE.
47
 In May 
2010 the Department of Energy (“DOE”) took heed of the Vice 
President’s report; the DOE issued best practice guidelines for PACE 
implementation
48
 and made additional grant funding available to states 
through ARRA. More significantly, twenty-five more states and the 
District of Columbia have enacted PACE legislation within the past four 
 
 
www.hprcenter.org/sites/default/files/ec_pro/hprcenter/best_practices_case_study_palm_desert.pdf. 
 43. Sonoma County reported 8.4 percent job growth in trade labor industries during the first year 
of the PACE program; surrounding counties saw trade labor employment drop. CASE STUDY: SONOMA 
COUNTY, supra note 42, at 5. 
 44. See supra note 7 for a listing of states that have enacted PACE legislation. 
 45. “Home retrofits can potentially help people earn money, as home retrofit workers, while also 
helping them save money, by lowering their utility bills. By encouraging nationwide weatherization of 
homes, workers of all skill levels will be trained, engaged, and will participate in ramping up a 
national home retrofit market.” MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE ET AL., RECOVERY THROUGH RETROFIT 1 
(2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Recovery_Through_Retrofit_Final_ 
Report.pdf. 
 46. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
Commonly known as “the stimulus,” ARRA authorized $787 billion in federal spending in an effort to 
halt or at least ameliorate the effects of the economic recession. Id. 
 47. MIDDLE CLASS TAX FORCE ET AL., supra note 45. The report identified three barriers to 
widespread energy retrofitting by consumers and homeowners: lack of access to reliable information 
concerning energy retrofitting standards, the relative unavailability of financing for energy retrofitting 
projects, and insufficient skilled workers. Id. at 1. The report proposed a number of solutions to these 
potential obstacles, including developing an energy performance label for homes, developing a 
national home energy performance measure, establishing national workforce certifications and training 
standards for energy retrofitting, and supporting municipal energy financing, such as PACE. Id. at 2–4. 
 48. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GUIDELINES FOR PILOT PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS (2010) [hereinafter 
DOE PACE GUIDELINES], available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/arra_guidelines_for_ 
pilot_pace_programs.pdf. These guidelines were developed to “help ensure prudent financing practices 
during the current pilot PACE programs.” Id. at 1. Specifically, the Department of Energy proposed 
that: the expected SIR should be greater than one for any proposed energy retrofit financed through 
PACE, the term of the assessment should not exceed the life of the energy efficiency improvements, 
the mortgage holder of record should receive notice when PACE liens are placed, PACE liens should 
not accelerate upon homeowner default, and quality assurance and anti-fraud measures should be 
implemented. Id. at 2–4. 
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years.
49
 Federal PACE legislation was also introduced in the House of 
Representatives, although it failed to make it out of committee.
50
  
Despite these successes, PACE programs have also been subject to 
criticism. It has been suggested that PACE is bad public policy due to the 
burdens it potentially places on lenders and loan servicers such as the 
government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.
51
 As noted above, PACE legislation typically provides that PACE 
liens are superior to pre-existing mortgages on the property.
52
 Since 
various subsidies exist for helping homeowners finance energy efficiency 
retrofits,
53
 unscrupulous homeowners could, PACE critics argue, apply for 
expensive PACE financing and subsidies and walk away from the 
property, pocketing the subsidies as a windfall.
54
 When the property then 
goes through foreclosure, sale proceeds would first go towards paying off 
the PACE assessment, reducing the amount recovered by the mortgage 
holder.
55
 Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are already undercapitalized, 
the argument goes, this will further damage their portfolios, putting them 
in greater financial jeopardy.
56
 
Critics also contend that the first-priority status of PACE liens creates 
too much risk for lenders and loan servicers even without unethical 
homeowners cashing in on energy efficiency subsidies before 
 
 
 49. For examples of other states’ PACE enabling statutes, see supra notes 28 and 29; see also, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-9.7-101 through 40.9.7-123 (West Supp. 2011); 65 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 5/1-1-11 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1710.01–1710.13 (West 2009 
& Supp. 2011). 
 50. H.R. 3836, 111th Cong. (2009). This legislation would have changed the Department of 
Energy indirect loan guarantee program to provide 100 percent guarantees for PACE bond programs, 
allowing more municipalities to successfully finance PACE programs. Id. 
 51. See MICHAEL SWARTZ, A WHITE PAPER ON PACE LOANS: UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND 
DAMAGING TO GSE’S SUCH AS FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 5–7 (2010). This white paper also 
argues that PACE programs violate Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides “No 
State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Id. at 2. The white paper 
further contends that PACE violates Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which constrains 
local governments’ ability to impose fees, assessments, and taxes. Id. at 4–5. These constitutional 
arguments are outside the scope of this Note. For an excellent rebuttal of these arguments, see SANJAY 
RANCHOD ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE) 
PROGRAMS UNDER FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW: A WHITE PAPER (2010); see also Ian M. Larson, 
Note, Keeping PACE: Federal Mortgage Lenders Halt Local Clean Energy Programs, 76 MO. L. REV. 
599, 622–26 (2010). 
 52. See supra note 29. 
 53. See, e.g., Federal Tax Credits for Consumer Energy Efficiency, ENERGY STAR, http://www 
.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=tax_credits.tx_index (last updated Jan. 3, 2012). These programs provide 
tax credits to homeowners who install certain prescribed energy efficiency improvements on their 
homes. Id. 
 54. See SWARTZ, supra note 51, at 5–6. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/4
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encumbering the property with a large PACE assessment and then 
defaulting.
57
 These critics maintain that the first-priority status of the 
assessments creates too great a risk for lenders, especially in the current 
weak economy.
58
  
PACE has also been criticized on the ground that it creates a patchwork 
of laws that are inconsistent from state to state, and even from 
municipality to municipality within the same state when it comes to a 
PACE program’s implementation.59 Some critics say that this 
inconsistency in PACE programs leads to greater risk and transactional 
costs for lenders and loan servicers because of the lack of uniform 
underwriting standards for granting PACE financing to homeowners.
60
 As 
the lending business is now national or even global in scope, and 
mortgages are often repackaged and resold multiple times during their 
lifetimes,
61
 it can be difficult for mortgage holders to assess the value of 
their portfolios.
62
 Since overvalued mortgage portfolios partially 
precipitated the economic crisis in 2008,
63
 some lenders and regulators are 
wary of a program like PACE that has the potential to create further 
uncertainty in mortgage-backed assets’ valuation.64 
Motivated by these concerns, and perhaps being overly cautious in the 
wake of the recent economic upheaval in which Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac played a key role, the FHFA took action to halt the further spread of 
residential PACE in the summer of 2010.
65
 In May of 2010, Fannie Mae 
 
 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. Id. This fear is unfounded. See discussion infra notes 77–105 and accompanying text. 
 59. See, e.g., Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities at 16, California v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 4:10-cv-03084-CW (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 2, 2010). As discussed below, this is the primary concern the FHFA has regarding PACE 
programs. 
 60. Id. As noted above, the DOE has proposed a set of best practice guidelines for PACE 
underwriting criteria that directly address this concern. DOE PACE GUIDELINES, supra note 48. 
 61. Eric Dash, Freddie Mac Purchased and Sold Faulty Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2005, at C3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/14/business/14freddie.html. 
 62. Peter J. Henning, The Mortgage-Backed Securities Mess, DEALBOOK (Oct. 22, 2010, 10:00 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/the-mortgage-backed-securities-mess/. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See supra note 59. 
 65. The FHFA is an independent regulatory agency created by the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. “[HERA] combined the staffs of the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Federal Housing Finance Board 
(FHFB), and the [government sponsored enterprise] mission office at the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).” About FHFA, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default 
.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). The FHFA supervises and regulates Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Id. Moreover, pursuant to HERA, in September of 2008 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into a conservatorship run by the FHFA. Id. This direct 
control of the GSEs by the FHFA has continued to the present day. Id. 
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and Freddie Mac issued letters to lenders and loan servicers indicating that 
PACE financing is incompatible with the GSEs’ Uniform Security 
Instruments.
66
 For instance, the letter from Freddie Mac stated that 
“energy-related lien[s] may not be senior to any Mortgage delivered to 
Freddie Mac.”67 Shortly thereafter, the FHFA issued a Statement (“the 
Statement”) that asserted that PACE programs “present significant safety 
and soundness concerns . . . [and] pose unusual and difficult risk 
management challenges for lenders.”68 Finally, on August 31, 2010, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac released guidance letters confirming that 
they would neither purchase nor refinance mortgages with first priority 
PACE liens.
69
 Since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together own or 
guarantee over half of the residential mortgages in the United States,
70
 
these actions on the part of the FHFA and the GSEs effectively killed 
residential PACE programs throughout the country.
71
 States have halted 
the implementation of their PACE programs,
72
 existing municipal PACE 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., Letter from Fannie Mae to All Fannie Mae Single-Family Sellers and Servicers 
(May 5, 2010), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/ll1006.pdf. 
Uniform Security Instruments are the notes, riders, and security instruments (deeds of trust and 
mortgages) used when originating residential mortgages in the United States. See Single-Family 
Uniform Instruments, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/ (last visited Mar. 16, 
2012). 
 67. Letter from Freddie Mac to Freddie Mac Sellers/Servicers (May 5, 2010), available at http:// 
www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/iltr050510.pdf. 
 68. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy Retrofit Loan 
Programs (July 6, 2010) [hereinafter FHFA Statement], available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/ 
15884/PACESTMT7610.pdf. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) all 
issued statements that mirrored the FHFA Statement. See Bulletin OCC 2010-25, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Supervisory Guidance on Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) 
Programs (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2010/bulletin-2010 
-25.html; Financial Institution Letter 37-2010, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Alert on FHFA Statement 
Relative to Concerns with Certain Energy Lending Programs (July 6, 2010), available at http://www. 
fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/fil10037.html; Regulatory Alert 10-RA-10, Nat’l Credit Union 
Admin., Potential Risks of Property Assessed Clean Energy Loans (July 2010), available at http:// 
www.ncua.gov/Legal/Pages/RA2010-10.aspx. As these statements parrot the FHFA’s concerns with 
PACE, this Note will only directly address the FHFA’s Statement; the following analysis is equally 
applicable to these other agencies’ statements. 
 69. See Announcement SEL-2010-12, Fannie Mae, Options for Borrowers with a PACE Loan 
(Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/A73585B8-6541-4A77-8184-1BE 
FB4AB2E60/68573/FannieMaePaceAnnouncement.pdf; Bulletin 2010-20, Freddie Mac, Mortgages 
Secured by Properties with an Outstanding Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Obligation (Aug. 
31, 2010), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll1020 .pdf. 
 70. Atkinson, supra note 12. 
 71. See, e.g., Staci Matlock, Feds Stall County Renewable Energy Loan Program, SANTA FE 
NEW MEXICAN, July 24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/ 
Feds-stall-county-s-renewable-energy-loan-program. 
 72. Id.; see also Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief at 3, California v. Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, No. 4:10-cv-03084-CW (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2010). 
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programs have stopped accepting new applications,
73
 and lenders have 
required property owners to pay off their PACE assessments in full before 
allowing the property owners to refinance their mortgages.
74
  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FHFA’S ACTIONS 
The FHFA’s actions in halting PACE were unwarranted and make little 
sense from a public policy perspective. Certainly the FHFA must act 
cautiously in directing the actions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as they 
attempt to guide the GSEs to solvency.
75
 However, in this instance the 
FHFA’s actions bespeak a lack of proper risk analysis on the agency’s 
part. As discussed below, PACE utilizes a form of municipal financing 
that has been in existence for over one hundred years, and well designed 
PACE programs do not create undue risk for lenders or threaten the value 
of mortgage-based assets. 
The FHFA Statement, which effectively halted PACE programs 
throughout the country, reads in relevant part: 
[P]rograms denominated as Property Assessed Clean Energy 
(PACE) seek to foster lending for retrofits of residential or 
commercial properties through a county or city’s tax assessment 
regime. Under most of these programs, such loans acquire a priority 
lien over existing mortgages, though certain states have chosen not 
to adopt such priority positions for their loans.  
 First liens established by PACE loans are unlike routine tax 
assessments and pose unusual and difficult risk management 
challenges for lenders, servicers and mortgage securities investors. 
The size and duration of PACE loans exceed typical local tax 
programs and do not have the traditional community benefits 
associated with taxing initiatives.
76
 
This letter’s conclusory language is unsupported by any analysis 
whatsoever. If the FHFA had engaged in an analysis of the effect PACE 
 
 
 73. Matlock, supra note 71. 
 74. J. Cullen Howe, Federal PACE Program Threatened by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
GREEN BUILDING L. UPDATE SERVICE (July 6, 2010), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/greenbuildinglaw/ 
2010/07/06/federal-pace-program-threatened-by-fannie-may-and-freddie-mac/. 
 75. Indeed, the FHFA has a statutory duty to do so. HERA provides that the FHFA must 
“oversee the prudential operations of each regulated entity [Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal 
Home Loan Banks]” and ensure that the regulated entities operate in a “safe and sound manner.” 12 
U.S.C. §§ 4513(a)(1)(A)–(B)(i) (Supp. 2010). 
 76. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
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programs have upon the value of mortgages held by its regulated entities, 
however, the FHFA may have ultimately concluded that PACE legislation 
bolsters, rather than harms, the value of mortgages held by regulated 
entities, for several reasons. 
First, data show that homeowners who obtain PACE financing for 
energy efficiency improvements are likely to actually increase the value of 
the property, benefitting lenders and loan servicers such as the GSEs.
77
 
Furthermore, well designed PACE programs will save homeowners money 
by reducing utility bills by a greater amount than is spent on the PACE 
assessment.
78
 Thus, these homeowners should generally be in a better 
position to pay off their mortgages, reducing their risk of default. Indeed, 
at least one study has shown that a positive correlation exists between 
homes with energy efficiency improvements and lower default and 
delinquency rates.
79
  
Moreover, as noted above, PACE assessments are merely variations on 
land-secured financing districts upon which assessments are levied to 
serve some public good.
80
 Such districts have long been a regular feature 
of many states’ statutory framework.81 These traditional assessments also 
have priority lien status, and longstanding practice by the FHFA and the 
GSEs indicates that these assessments are entirely compatible with 
standard Uniform Security Instruments.
82
 The FHFA attempts to 
distinguish PACE assessments from these traditional assessments by 
characterizing PACE assessments as “loans” in its Statement,83 and by 
stating that “[t]he size and duration of PACE loans exceed typical local tax 
programs and do not have the traditional community benefits associated 
with taxing initiatives.”84 The duration of a PACE assessment is 
immaterial; properly structured PACE legislation does not accelerate the 
entirety of the PACE financing secured by a homeowner in the event of 
default.
85
 Instead, only delinquent assessment payments become due.
86
 
 
 
 77. One study shows that property values increase from $10 to $25 for every $1 saved on utility 
bills due to energy efficiency improvements. See Rick Nevin & Gregory Watson, Evidence of Rational 
Market Valuations for Home Energy Efficiency, APPRAISAL J., Oct. 1998, at 401. 
 78. See PACE WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 25–26. 
 79. Jonathan Hiskes, Energy Efficiency Helps Homeowners Avoid Foreclosure, GRIST (July 13, 
2010, 1:13 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-12-home-energy-efficiency-cuts-mortgage-default-
rates.-fannie-fredd. 
 80. See supra note 24 and infra note 152. 
 81. See supra note 24. 
 82. See infra note 152. 
 83. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See PACE WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 5. 
 86. Id. 
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Additionally, under a well designed PACE program the amount of 
financing a particular homeowner will be able to secure will be 
commensurate with the homeowner’s ability to repay the assessment, as 
determined by standardized underwriting criteria.
87
 PACE programs 
should therefore pose no more risk to lenders and loan servicers than more 
traditional, well-accepted tax assessments that have first priority status. 
The FHFA’s attempt to distinguish PACE assessments by stating that 
they “do not have the traditional community benefits associated with 
taxing initiatives”88 is unavailing for additional reasons as well. Not only 
does the FHFA fail to support this assertion, but it is also false on its face. 
States and municipalities enact and implement, respectively, PACE 
programs specifically for the benefits that accrue to their communities, 
including job growth, reduced energy consumption, lower utility bills, and 
reduced GHG emissions. For example, the Vermont PACE statute 
provides that “[t]he general assembly finds that it is in the public interest 
for municipalities to finance renewable energy projects and energy 
efficiency projects in light of the [greenhouse gas reduction and building 
efficiency] goals set forth [by statute].”89 These goals fall squarely within 
the type of “community benefits” that traditionally derive from such tax 
assessment programs, such as sewer lines, sidewalks, seismic retrofitting, 
and fire safety.
90
 
The concern that a potentially unscrupulous homeowner who is 
“underwater” on her mortgage and may be tempted to apply for PACE 
financing with the intention of pocketing available energy efficiency 
subsidies before walking away from the property has already been 
addressed. As mentioned above, the Department of Energy has 
promulgated best practice guidelines to ensure that these scenarios do not 
occur.
91
 These guidelines also address other concerns raised by the FHFA 
in its Statement. Specifically, the Statement reads: 
Underwriting for PACE programs results in collateral-based lending 
rather than lending based upon ability-to-pay, the absence of Truth-
in-Lending Act and other consumer protections, and uncertainty as 
to whether the home improvements actually produce meaningful 
reductions in energy consumption. . . . However, first liens that 
disrupt a fragile housing finance market and long-standing lending 
 
 
 87. Id. at 6; see also DOE PACE GUIDELINES, supra note 48, at 5–7. 
 88. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 89. Vermont Energy Act of 2009, H. 446, 2009–2010 Leg. Sess. § 15e (Vt. 2009). 
 90. See supra note 24. 
 91. DOE PACE GUIDELINES, supra note 48. 
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priorities, the absence of robust underwriting standards to protect 
homeowners and the lack of energy retrofit standards to assist 
homeowners, appraisers, inspectors and lenders determine the value 
of retrofit products combine to raise safety and soundness 
concerns.
92
 
As with the Statement’s earlier assertions that found fault with PACE 
legislation, these concerns too lack evidentiary support and are ultimately 
unfounded. The DOE’s best practice guidelines address all of these 
concerns and did so before the Statement was issued.
93
 These guidelines 
include stringent underwriting criteria,
94
 including ensuring that the 
Savings-to-Investment ratio will be greater than one,
95
 that the homeowner 
is current on her property taxes,
96
 and that the property’s value exceeds the 
homeowner’s public and private debt on the property (i.e., ensuring that 
the homeowner is not “underwater”),97 among others. As noted by the 
DOE, these best practice guidelines are “significantly more rigorous than 
the underwriting standards currently applied to land-secured financing 
districts.”98 Given the FHFA’s acceptance of the first priority status of the 
assessments applied pursuant to traditional land-secured financing 
districts,
99
 the agency’s refusal to countenance PACE is simply illogical. 
Finally, even in a worst-case scenario under PACE, wherein a 
homeowner with a PACE assessment on her property goes into default, a 
lender’s risk is extremely limited under a well designed PACE program.100 
For example, say a homeowner applies for and receives $15,000 in PACE 
financing for energy efficiency retrofits. Assuming that the PACE 
financing amount does not accelerate upon default, as provided by the 
DOE’s best practice guidelines,101 then only the PACE assessment 
payments that are delinquent before the property is foreclosed upon will be 
paid out of the foreclosure proceeds.
102
 If the foreclosure process takes one 
year, that would mean that $1,000 must be paid from the foreclosure sale 
proceeds; the remainder of the PACE assessment would transfer with the 
 
 
 92. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 93. See DOE PACE GUIDELINES, supra note 48. The FHFA issued its Statement on July 6, 2010, 
two months after the DOE issued its best practices guidelines on May 7, 2010.  
 94. Id. at 5–7. 
 95. Id. at 6. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 99. See infra note 152. 
 100. See generally PACE WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 16–17. 
 101. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 102. See PACE WHITE PAPER, supra note 30, at 16–17. 
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property.
103
 Furthermore, assuming a high default rate of 10 percent means 
that lenders are looking at a potential loss of $150 per PACE-financed 
home—hardly a catastrophic amount for lenders.104 And in at least one 
local jurisdiction that has implemented PACE, property tax delinquency is 
far less common among homeowners that have applied for and received 
PACE financing as compared to those that have not.
105
 
In sum, there is nothing intrinsic about PACE financing that makes it 
incompatible with prudent lending practices, even in these distressed 
economic times. Thus, FHFA’s actions make little rational sense. 
However, FHFA’s Statement is more than unwise; it is also unlawful. 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PRESENT PACE IMPASSE 
There are a number of possible ways to break the current impasse 
concerning PACE, although some options are more feasible than others. 
These options range from direct negotiation with the FHFA on one end of 
the spectrum, to judicial action enjoining the FHFA from enforcing its 
unlawful Statement on the other. Ideally all interested parties would come 
together in a rulemaking on the FHFA’s part that explicitly allows PACE 
financing provided that sufficiently stringent underwriting standards are 
utilized. The notice and comment process
106
 would allow interested parties 
to make their opinions known regarding the best way to allow PACE 
financing to go forward while ensuring that lenders and loan servicers are 
not subject to unnecessary risks. Although a combination negotiation-
legislative fix might be ideal, a judicial solution may very well be 
necessary given the FHFA’s recalcitrance and the current hyper-partisan 
political climate. 
A. Negotiation and Executive Action 
Shortly after the Statement was issued, the DOE, which has thus far 
strongly backed PACE as an effective means to reduce energy 
consumption,
107
 entered into negotiations with the FHFA with the hope of 
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See supra note 79. 
 106. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) requires federal agencies to publish proposed 
rules in the Federal Register and to provide the opportunity for public comment on such proposed 
rules. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(c) (2006). 
 107. See supra note 48; see also Jonathan Hiskes, Obama Admin Unable to Resolve Shutdown of 
PACE Clean-Energy Program, GRIST (July 3, 2010, 2:08 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-
02-obama-admin-unable-to-stop-shutdown-of-pace-clean-energy-program. 
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convincing the agency that PACE programs, properly structured, present 
no special risk to lenders and thereby to FHFA regulated entities Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.
108
 However, these negotiations proved 
unsuccessful, with the FHFA indicating that the first priority status of 
PACE liens was simply unacceptable, regardless of how they were 
“structured, accelerated, or insured.”109 As a final gambit for convincing 
the FHFA to change its mind, Congressman Steve Israel proposed a PACE 
pilot program, under which 300,000 homes would be allowed to obtain 
PACE financing pursuant to the DOE’s best practice guidelines.110 This 
pilot program could have allowed the FHFA to see if their predictions of 
the dire consequences of allowing PACE to go forward would be realized 
in a controlled manner. However, the FHFA refused to allow such a 
program to proceed.
111
 At this point, therefore, it would appear that direct 
negotiations with the agency have broken down. 
B. State or Federal Legislation 
Another possible answer could come in the form of state PACE 
legislation that complies with the FHFA’s demands. Specifically, since the 
FHFA objects to the senior priority status of PACE assessments over pre-
existing mortgages,
112
 states could simply enact PACE legislation that 
provides that PACE assessments receive no special priority over pre-
existing liens. Presumably, the FHFA would have no objection to such 
programs. But as was explained above, it is predicted that PACE 
assessments with junior lien status would not allow municipalities to find 
the needed purchasers for the bonds used to finance these programs.
113
 
Nevertheless, at least one state has enacted such a statute.
114
 It remains to 
 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Jonathan Hiskes, Fate of PACE Clean-Energy Programs About to Become Clearer, GRIST 
(July 21, 2010, 3:18 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-20-fate-of-pace-clean-energy-programs-
about-to-become-clearer. FHFA responded to the proposal with a 10,000 property pilot test program, 
which Congressman Israel rejected. “‘[That figure] does not suggest a real commitment to the 
program. There’s no statistician in America who would suggest you could get a valid sample with 
10,000 homes,’ he said.” Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 29. 
 114. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A §§ 10151–10162 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011). Section 
10156(3) provides that “the priority of a PACE mortgage created under subsection 2 is determined 
based on the date of filing of notice required under subsection 2 and applicable law. A PACE 
mortgage is not entitled to any special or senior priority.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 10156(3) 
(West 2010 & Supp. 2011). 
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be seen whether PACE will be as successful there as it has been in states 
that provide that PACE assessments are senior to pre-existing liens. 
Federal legislation could also resolve the current impasse. Indeed, bills 
were introduced in both the House
115
 and the Senate
116
 shortly after the 
issuance of the FHFA Statement that would have (1) required the FHFA to 
adopt underwriting standards for PACE programs consistent with those 
promulgated by the DOE, (2) established that PACE financing issued 
pursuant to such guidelines was compatible with the Uniform Security 
Instruments of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, (3) prohibited Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac from requiring the complete repayment of any PACE 
assessment prior to allowing a homeowner to refinance her mortgage, (4) 
provided that only delinquent PACE assessment payments were due in the 
event of default, and (5) prohibited the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie 
Mac from discriminating against states and communities that have 
implemented PACE programs.
117
 Such legislation would have allowed 
PACE financing to resume its previous steady progress. However, neither 
the House nor the Senate bill made it out of committee.
118
 Similar 
legislation was proposed in 2011, but it also failed to be reported from 
committee.
119
 No such legislation has yet been introduced in 2012 at the 
time of this writing.  
 
 
 115. PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5766, 111th Cong (2010); see also Jonathan 
Hiskes, House Democrats Introduce Bill to Defend PACE Clean-Energy Program, GRIST (July 16, 
2010, 7:45 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-15-democrats-introduce-pace-bill-to-defend-
clean-energy-program. 
 116. PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, S. 3642, 111th Cong (2010). This bill’s language 
is identical to its House counterpart. The stated purpose of these bills was to “ensure that the 
underwriting standards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac facilitate the use of property assessed clean 
energy programs to finance the installation of renewable energy and energy efficiency improvements.” 
Id.; see also Jonathan Hiskes, Senate PACE Bill Adds to Pressure to Restore Clean-Energy Program, 
GRIST (July 23, 2010, 5:39 AM), http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-22-senate-pace-bill-adds-to-
pressure-to-restoreclean-energy-program. 
 117. PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 5766, 111th Cong (2010). 
 118. H.R. 5766 was referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on July 15, 2010, and 
died in committee. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010), H.R. 5766, THOMAS, http:// 
thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). Likewise, the Senate version was referred to the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on July 22, 2010, and also died in committee. Bill 
Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010), S. 3642, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
 119. PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2599, 112th Cong. (2011). The bill enjoys 
bipartisan support, with twenty Republican cosponsors and thirty-one Democratic cosponsors at the 
time of this writing. However, no action has been taken on the bill since it was referred to the 
Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity in August of 2011. Bill Summary 
& Status, 112th Congress (2010–2011), H.R.2599, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/ (last visited Mar. 
16, 2012). 
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C. Litigation 
Since direct negotiation and legislative solutions have failed,
120
 judicial 
action may be the only recourse for proponents of PACE. This approach is 
far from ideal, as it makes an adversary out of the agency that will 
continue to have a strong say in the future of PACE no matter what the 
outcome of such a lawsuit might be. However, such a lawsuit would 
appear to be the only means for restarting PACE at this juncture. In fact, 
numerous parties initiated lawsuits against the FHFA along these lines.
121
 
These parties include the State of California, the Sierra Club, and the 
National Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”), among others.122 All of 
these parties sought to enjoin the FHFA from further blocking the 
enactment or implementation of PACE legislation.
123
  
 
 
 120. See discussion supra Parts IV.A–B. 
 121. See Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, supra note 72; Complaint for 
Declaratory and Equitable Relief, Sierra Club v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 4:10-cv-
03084-CW (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010); Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, County of 
Sonoma v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 4:10-cv-03270-CW (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2010); 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City of Palm Desert v. Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, No. 4:10-cv-04482-CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, NRDC v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 1:10-cv-07647-SAS (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 8, 2010); Complaint, Town of Babylon v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 2:10-cv-04916-
LDW-ARL (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Leon County 
v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 4:10-cv-00436-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2010). 
 122. See supra note 121. 
 123. California seeks declaratory relief to the effect that California’s PACE program is compatible 
with the GSEs’ Uniform Security Instruments. Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, supra 
note 72. California also seeks to have the FHFA’s Statement overturned on the grounds that it failed to 
comport with the APA and NEPA. Id. at 13–14. Finally, California claims that the FHFA violated 
California state law by engaging in unfair competition. Id. at 12–13. NRDC, Palm Desert, and the 
Sierra Club likewise claim that the FHFA failed to comply with the APA and NEPA. First Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NRDC, supra note 121, at 14–16; Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City of Palm Desert, supra note 121, at 4–22; Complaint for 
Declaratory and Equitable Relief, Sierra Club, supra note 121, at 11–13. Sonoma County’s complaint 
seeks declaratory relief that assessments administered under its Sonoma County Energy Independence 
Program are compatible with the GSEs’ Uniform Security Instruments, and also claims that the FHFA 
failed to comply with the APA and NEPA and interfered with prospective contractual relations with 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, County of Sonoma, 
supra note 121, at 11–15. Leon County alleged that the FHFA violated NEPA, the APA, the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, and Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Leon County, supra note 121, at 22–29. Babylon claimed that 
the FHFA violated NEPA, the APA, and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, and engaged in 
tortious interference with a contractual relationship. Complaint, Town of Babylon, supra note 121, at 
14–21. 
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1. Analysis of the FHFA’s Statement’s Legality Under the APA 
The FHFA violated the Administrative Procedure Act
124
 in two distinct 
ways when it issued its Statement. First, in promulgating a substantive rule 
that creates new prospective binding norms,
125
 the FHFA should have 
allowed for notice and comment from the public pursuant to section 553 of 
the APA.
126
 Second, by failing to provide analysis in support of its 
decision to “pause” PACE programs,127 and by acting contrary to the 
evidence that is available,
128
 the FHFA has acted in a manner that is 
arbitrary and capricious as provided in section 706(2)(A) of the APA.
129
 
The FHFA Statement should therefore be set aside by a reviewing court, at 
the very least to provide the public the opportunity to comment on the 
FHFA’s action. 
As an initial matter, the FHFA Statement meets the requirements for 
judicial review.
130
 Courts have required that three threshold conditions be 
met before they have been willing to review agency actions. First, an 
agency action must be final.
131
 FHFA’s Statement bears numerous marks 
 
 
 124. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596, 701–706 (2006). The APA broadly sets forth the procedures by which 
federal agencies must abide. 
 125. Specifically, the Statement reads, “FHFA is directing Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the 
Federal Home Loan Banks to undertake the following prudential actions . . . .” FHFA Statement, supra 
note 68. 
 126. Section 553(b) of the APA requires that “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be 
published in the Federal Register . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Section 553(c) of the APA provides that 
“[a]fter notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(c). These provisions are collectively known as “notice and comment,” and this process is known 
as informal rulemaking. Formal rulemaking, which requires a public hearing and other more 
cumbersome procedural requirements, is initiated when an enabling statute calls for rules to be made 
“on the record” following the procedures outlined in sections 556 and 557 of the APA. Id. 
 127. See discussion supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 79. 
 129. Section 706 of the APA provides the scope of judicial review for actions taken by federal 
agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 706. In particular, the provision provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 130. See id. § 704. This provision provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and 
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review.” Id. 
 131. This requirement derives from the language of section 704 of the APA, supra note 130. An 
oft-followed formula for finality holds that the agency “action must mark the ‘consummation’ of the 
agency’s decisionmaking process [and] not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory character”; and 
“the action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal 
consequences will flow.’” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Oregon Nat’l Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that courts determine whether agency action is final by “look[ing] to whether the action ‘amounts to a 
definitive statement of the agency’s position’ or ‘has a direct and immediate effect on the day-to-day 
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of finality. It states that the Statement is the result of a year of “careful 
review” and deliberation.132 As a result of this “careful review,” the FHFA 
is directing its regulated entities to take action
133—this is not a tentative 
step but a “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” in the 
words of Bennett v. Spear.
134
 And while the Statement allows that the 
FHFA is willing to work further with interested parties in encouraging 
energy efficiency, there is no indication that the agency is willing to 
change its mind when it comes to PACE programs in their current form.
135
 
Thus, this Statement announces new legal obligations from which 
consequences will flow—the GSEs will no longer purchase mortgages 
encumbered by a PACE lien.
136
 
Second, the party that seeks judicial review of the agency action must 
first exhaust all administrative remedies.
137
 In this case, there are no 
administrative remedies for potential plaintiffs to exhaust. Since the FHFA 
issued the Statement without giving the opportunity for notice and 
comment, there was no occasion for the plaintiffs to lodge their objections 
to the Statement with the agency. 
Finally, an agency action must be “ripe” to be judicially reviewable.138 
That is, the plaintiff must not be bringing the action prematurely. The 
main factors used in determining whether a claim is ripe are “the fitness of 
the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration.”139 In this case, the issues are ripe for 
judicial review as they are purely legal—whether the Statement is a 
legislative rule under the APA and whether it constitutes a major federal 
action significantly affecting the environment for the purposes of NEPA. 
There are no factual disputes to be resolved. Moreover, withholding court 
consideration would impose significant hardship on those parties who seek 
to continue use of PACE programs to increase energy efficiency by 
 
 
operations’ of the subject party, or if ‘immediate compliance [with the terms] is expected’”) 
(alterations in original). 
 132. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78; see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a guidance document was final because it contained binding, mandatory 
language). 
 135. See FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (holding that a 
company that was the subject of a hearing by the NLRB could not seek injunction in federal court 
because it had not exhausted prescribed administrative remedies). 
 138. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).  
 139. Id. at 149. 
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preventing them from receiving the funding necessary to make such 
improvements.
140
 
Furthermore, the Statement is a rule,
141
 as opposed to an order,
142
 and 
thus the Statement should have been promulgated to the public to give it 
the opportunity to comment before the rule went into effect. The APA 
defines a rule as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, 
or prescribe law or policy . . . .”143 Per this definition, rules tend to look 
prospectively in setting legal obligations for undefined groups of 
persons,
144
 whereas orders tend to look retrospectively in determining the 
legal consequences of past actions for defined parties.
145
 Another 
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is that rulemaking tends 
to rely on policy-based legislative facts, whereas adjudication rests on 
specific, concrete facts.
146
 In this case, the FHFA Statement by its own 
terms regulates the future conduct of the GSEs—not their past actions—
and the parties who might in the future feel the consequences of the 
Statement are undefined.
147
 Moreover, the Statement is based not on 
 
 
 140. For the purpose of seeking judicial review, an ideal plaintiff would be one who has been 
directly affected by the FHFA’s Statement. Examples of such a plaintiff include a property owner who 
has been denied mortgage refinancing due to the presence of a PACE lien on the property, or a 
municipality that can no longer justify financing energy efficiency improvements in light of the 
FHFA’s action. 
 141. Informal rulemakings are governed by section 553 of the APA, which requires notice and 
comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  
 142. Orders are the result of adjudications, which may either be formal—meaning a hearing is 
required to be “on the record” by statute—and thus governed by sections 554, 556, and 557 of the 
APA, or informal and thus governed by section 555 of the APA 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557. Informal 
adjudications provide fewer procedural protections for parties than their formal counterparts. 
Adjudications do not provide for notice and comment, but rather, generally provide the opportunity for 
a public hearing and other more quasi-judicial procedures. Id.  
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). While this definition includes the words “or particular,” this phrase is 
controversial in the case law, and it is “generally acknowledged that the only responsible judicial 
attitude toward this central APA definition is one of benign disregard.” Antonin Scalia, Vermont 
Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 383. 
 144. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that 
an agency action constituted a rule when it applied to an indefinite group of parties prospectively). 
 145. See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that a city council action was 
adjudicative when it pertained to a specific, defined group of persons). 
 146. See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:2, at 412 (2d ed. 1979) 
(“The crucial difference between [adjudication and rulemaking] is that in [adjudication] specific facts 
about the particular property [are] disputed, but in [rulemaking] no such specific facts [are] disputed, 
for the problem [is] broad and general . . . .”). 
 147. The Statement specifically states that “[f]or any homeowner who obtained a PACE or PACE-
like loan with a priority first lien prior to this date, FHFA is directing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
waive their Uniform Security Instrument prohibitions against such senior liens,” thus excluding those 
homeowners who obtained PACE financing prior to the issuance of the statement from regulation. 
FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
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specific findings of fact concerning past events but rather on findings of 
fact that are legislative or general in nature.
148
 These factors all cut in 
favor of the Statement being a rule subject to the provisions of the APA 
requiring notice and comment rather than an order. 
Not only is the Statement a rule, but it is a substantive, legislative rule 
subject to the notice and comment provisions of section 553 of the APA.
149
 
Legislative rules are those rules that establish a “binding norm.”150 In 
addition, courts tend to find a rule to be a “binding norm” and thus 
legislative when it contains mandatory language that indicates that the 
agency is not open to reexamining its position.
151
 Both of these factors 
show that the FHFA’s Statement is a legislative rule. The new “binding 
norm” in this instance is the fact that PACE assessments, contrary to how 
special assessment districts have been treated by the GSEs in the past, are 
deemed incompatible with the GSEs’ Uniform Security Instruments;152 the 
Statement’s mandatory language shows that the FHFA is not open to 
reexamining this issue.
153
 Thus, the Statement is a legislative rule subject 
to notice and comment.
154
 Since the FHFA did not, in fact, allow for notice 
and comment on the Statement before its promulgation, the rule 
enunciated in the Statement is invalid and should be vacated until notice 
and comment can take place. 
 
 
 148. Specifically, the Statement rests on FHFA’s assumption that senior PACE liens pose an 
unacceptable risk to its regulated entities. This is precisely the kind of general, policy-based “fact” 
envisioned by Kenneth Culp Davis. See supra note 146. 
 149. See supra note 126. Non-legislative rules, which include interpretive rules and policy 
statements, are not subject to the notice and comment provisions of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) 
(2006). 
 150. See Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596, 600 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a document promulgated by the FDA was not a legislative rule because it failed to set a 
“binding norm” for future conduct, meaning it was “not finally determinative of the issues or rights to 
which it is addressed”). 
 151. See, e.g., CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the unequivocal 
language of an EPA announcement established a “binding norm” that had the force of law, and was 
thus a legislative rule); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that a document 
promulgated by the EPA was a legislative rule and not a guidance document because it obliged parties 
to use predefined methods of chemical cleanup and bound the EPA to accept applications meeting pre-
defined criteria). 
 152. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. As noted above, land-financed special assessment districts 
have typically been found to be compatible with Uniform Security Instruments. See Ronald H. 
Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth With Impact 
Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 217 n.138 (2006) (mentioning the long history of special assessments in 
America); see also German Sav. & Loan Soc’y v. Ramish, 138 Cal. 120 (1902) (upholding priority of 
assessment lien for street improvements over prior mortgage). 
 153. In particular, the Statement reads “the FHFA is directing . . . .” FHFA Statement, supra note 
68 (emphasis added). This unqualified language suggests that the FHFA is not open to revisiting the 
issue.  
 154. See supra notes 126 and 149. 
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FHFA’s Statement is also unlawful under the APA on another 
ground—it could be found arbitrary and capricious under section 
706(2)(A) of the APA.
155
 Under one formulation of this standard, a court 
will overturn agency action where it “becomes aware, especially from a 
combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard 
look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned 
decision-making.”156 One factor courts look to in deciding whether an 
agency action is arbitrary and capricious is whether the agency is 
departing from agency precedent without adequate explanation.
157
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that an agency rule may be 
arbitrary and capricious if the agency offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.
158
 
Under this rubric, the FHFA’s Statement may be arbitrary and 
capricious because it fails to provide an adequate explanation for why it 
views PACE assessments to be so risky that they are to be deemed 
incompatible with the GSEs’ Uniform Security Instruments.159 This is 
especially true in light of evidence that homeowners who receive PACE 
funding have been found to be less likely to default on their mortgages 
than other borrowers,
160
 which seems to be contrary to the FHFA’s 
position that PACE programs pose unacceptable risk to lenders and, in 
 
 
 155. See supra note 129.  
 156. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote 
omitted); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 
(1983) (explaining that an agency must analyze the evidence available and provide a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made”). This standard of review has also been 
described as an inquiry into “whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors 
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). In the rulemaking context, as here, courts have stated that judicial review of 
rulemaking  
need be no less searching and strict [than in a case of formal adjudication], but, because it is 
addressed to different materials, it inevitably varies from the adjudicatory model. The 
paramount objective is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legislative task to 
perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and 
irrationality . . . . 
Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 157. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973) 
(remanding the Interstate Commerce Commission’s decision to impose new charges on grain 
inspection services so that the agency could justify its change in posture); Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1989) (remanding a NLRB decision that found an employer was 
engaging in unfair labor practices so that the NLRB could explain why it was significantly departing 
from agency precedent). 
 158. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 159. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 160. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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turn, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
161
 Finally, one can argue that the 
FHFA’s disparate treatment of PACE assessment districts as opposed to 
other special assessment districts also weighs in favor of a finding that its 
actions in halting PACE were arbitrary and capricious.
162
 
However, it is less likely that a court will rule that the FHFA’s 
Statement is arbitrary and capricious than it is that the FHFA was required 
to comply with the notice and comment provisions of the APA. First, 
courts are, as a rule, generally quite deferential to agency decision making 
when they are employing the arbitrary and capricious standard.
163
 Second, 
although the FHFA is departing from past precedent in treating PACE 
assessments differently than it has other special assessment districts in the 
past, it does provide some explanation.
164
 This explanation may not hold 
up to intense scrutiny, but it may be enough to satisfy a court.
165
 
Therefore, a realistic outcome for a litigant challenging the FHFA’s 
Statement under the APA would be for a court to vacate and remand the 
Statement to the FHFA so that the FHFA may comply with the notice and 
comment provisions before it puts the Statement into effect. 
2. Analysis of the FHFA’s Statement’s Legality Under NEPA 
Besides potentially being unlawful under various provisions of the 
APA, the FHFA Statement may also fail to comport with the requirements 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).166 NEPA requires 
federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement accompanying “every 
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major 
 
 
 161. FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 162. See supra note 152. 
 163. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) 
(“Under what we have called this ‘narrow’ standard of review . . . ‘a court is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency,’ and ‘should uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 164. “First liens established by PACE loans are unlike routine tax assessments and pose unusual 
and difficult risk management challenges for lenders, servicers and mortgage securities investors. The 
size and duration of PACE loans exceed typical local tax programs and do not have the traditional 
community benefits associated with taxing initiatives.” FHFA Statement, supra note 68. 
 165. Courts often remark that they do not need great detail; the basic requirement is that the 
agency reveal enough of its reasoning to permit meaningful judicial review. See, e.g., Ne. Md. Waste 
Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915 (7th 
Cir. 2000); Armstrong v. CFTC, 12 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 166. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). NEPA, which 
ushered in the “environmental decade” of the 1970s, in which the modern environmental regulatory 
framework was established in the United States, has been described as “one of the nation’s most 
important environmental laws.” Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and 
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904 (2002). 
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Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment” that describes these environmental effects.167 NEPA is 
procedural in nature; it requires agencies to take a “hard look” at the 
environmental consequences of their actions
168
 but does not require them 
to refrain from actions even if the environmental consequences are likely 
to be dire.
169
 The FHFA’s Statement may be challenged on the ground that 
it will prevent the public from improving the energy efficiency of their 
residential properties, thus increasing energy use and GHG emissions. The 
FHFA’s failure to conduct an environmental analysis of the effects of the 
Statement therefore violates NEPA, and the Statement should be 
remanded to the agency so that such an analysis may be conducted. 
As noted, NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (“EIS”)170 for “major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.”171 Key questions under 
NEPA concern what constitutes a “major Federal action” that 
“significantly” affects the environment. The CEQ, the entity charged with 
interpreting and administering NEPA,
172
 has defined these terms in 
regulations. “Major Federal action” is defined as “action[] with effects that 
may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and 
 
 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). More specifically, this provision requires a statement on the 
environmental effects of the proposed action that details  
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects 
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the 
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and 
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action 
should it be implemented. 
Id. Other provisions of NEPA direct federal agencies to integrate environmental concerns into their 
general policymaking, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A), and create the Council on Environmental Quality, which 
promulgates regulations interpreting NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4342. 
 168. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (“The . . . role for a court is to insure 
that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at [the] environmental consequences [of the proposed 
action.]”). 
 169. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (holding that 
NEPA does not impose a substantive requirement on federal agencies to choose the most 
environmentally friendly option available); Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic 
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that NEPA creates a judicially reviewable 
procedural duty on the part of federal agencies to consider environmental factors through the agency 
review process); see also Karkkainen, supra note 166, at 904 (“NEPA famously requires federal 
agencies to produce environmental impact statements (EISs) prior to undertaking ‘major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’ It requires little else, and therein 
lies both its singular genius and its fatal flaw.”) (footnote omitted). 
 170. An EIS is defined in CEQ regulations as “a detailed written statement as required by 
[NEPA].” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2010). 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
 172. See supra note 167. 
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responsibility.”173 The regulations set out four general categories into 
which major federal actions typically fall, including “[a]doption of official 
policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpretations adopted pursuant to 
the [APA and] formal documents establishing an agency’s policies which 
will result in or substantially alter agency programs.”174 CEQ regulations 
also define “significantly,” setting forth a number of factors that bear on 
whether an action “significantly” affects the environment.175 These factors 
include “[t]he degree to which the effects on the quality of the human 
environment are likely to be highly controversial,”176 “[t]he degree to 
which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain 
or involve unique or unknown risks,”177 “[t]he degree to which the action 
may establish a precedent for future actions with significant effects or 
represents a decision in principle about a future consideration,”178 and 
“[w]hether the action is related to other actions with individually 
insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts.”179 
CEQ regulations also provide for a document known as an 
Environmental Assessment (“EA”).180 An EA is a document that may be 
prepared by a federal agency if the federal agency is uncertain as to 
whether a full EIS is required.
181
 A kind of “mini-EIS,” an EA must 
include a discussion of possible alternatives to the proposed actions as 
 
 
 173. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
 174. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(1). 
 175. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27. 
 176. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4). 
 177. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5). 
 178. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(6). 
 179. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7). This regulation clarifies that “[s]ignificance exists if it is 
reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment. Significance cannot be 
avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into small component parts.” Id. 
 180. As defined in CEQ regulations, an Environmental Assessment  
(a) Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is responsible that serves to: 
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an 
environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact. (2) Aid an agency’s 
compliance with the Act when no environmental impact statement is necessary. (3) Facilitate 
preparation of a statement when one is necessary. (b) Shall include brief discussions of the 
need for the proposal, of alternatives as required by section 102(2)(E), of the environmental 
impacts of the proposed action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons 
consulted. 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.  
 181. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 provides that agencies should first determine if the proposed action is one 
that normally requires an EIS to be prepared. If there is no clear answer, the agency should prepare an 
EA. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(a)–(b). NEPA itself makes no mention of EAs; this framework is a 
codification of the holding of Hanly v. Kleindienst, in which the Second Circuit held that the General 
Services Administration was required to prepare a preliminary report to determine if a proposed action 
was “significant” enough to trigger NEPA requirements. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
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well as potential environmental impacts of the proposed actions and 
alternatives.
182
 If, after preparing an EA, a federal agency determines that 
the environmental impact of the proposed action will be, in fact, 
“significant,” the agency will go on to prepare a full EIS.183 If, on the other 
hand, the agency determines that an EIS is not needed, the agency will 
instead issue a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”).184 
NEPA also expressly contemplates environmental effects that are 
removed in time and space from the initial federal action that serves as the 
catalyst. CEQ regulations provide that EIS’s shall discuss “[i]ndirect 
effects and their significance.”185 Indirect effects are defined as those 
effects “which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther 
removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”186 
Considering the FHFA Statement in light of this regulatory framework, 
it appears likely that the FHFA violated NEPA when it failed to prepare an 
EIS prior to promulgating its Statement. The environmental effects of the 
Statement, though not direct, are still “reasonably foreseeable” as required 
by CEQ regulations.
187
 It is also well established that agency rules and 
regulations are “federal actions” for NEPA purposes,188 and as established 
above, the FHFA’s Statement should properly be considered a substantive 
rule.
189
 Furthermore, the Statement’s effect on the environment is likely to 
be highly controversial,
190
 the degree of the effects of the Statement is 
 
 
 182. See supra note 180. 
 183. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c). 
 184. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e). A FONSI is defined as “a document by a Federal agency briefly 
presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise excluded . . . will not have a significant effect on 
the human environment and for which an environmental impact statement therefore will not be 
prepared.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. 
 185. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(b). 
 186. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). 
 187. Id.; see also Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. 
Cal. 2003) (holding that construction of new power plants that will have an impact on air quality was a 
reasonably foreseeable indirect effect of building new transmission lines). 
 188. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (concerning rules for licensing new nuclear plants); Humane Soc’y v. 
Johanns, 520 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that regulation authorizing operation of fee-for-
service horse slaughter operation was a major federal action). 
 189. See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 
(2d Cir. 1972) (“[T]he term ‘controversial’ apparently refers to cases where a substantial dispute exists 
as to the size, nature or effect of the major federal action rather than to the existence of opposition to a 
use, the effect of which is relatively undisputed.”). Indeed, global warming and the extent to which it is 
caused by increased GHG emissions emitted by humans has been one of the most controversial topics 
of the last decade and a half. See, e.g., Eugene R. Dunn, Letter to the Editor, Global Warming a Hard 
Sell, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at B2, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/ 
7/global-warming-a-hard-sell/.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
928 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:901 
 
 
 
 
uncertain and involves unknown risks,
191
 the Statement may set a 
precedent that federal actions that result in increased GHG emissions need 
not be accompanied by an EIS,
192
 and the Statement is undoubtedly related 
to other individually insignificant but cumulatively significant actions that 
result in the increased emissions of GHGs.
193
 
If the FHFA were uncertain as to whether the environmental effects of 
its Statement would be significant for the purposes of NEPA, the agency 
should have prepared an EA as required by CEQ regulations.
194
 A realistic 
outcome to a challenge to FHFA’s Statement under NEPA, therefore, 
would be for a court to remand the Statement to the FHFA so that the 
agency may prepare an EA to determine if the environmental effects of the 
Statement will be significant. 
V. THE FUTURE OF PACE 
In sum, the concerns of the FHFA as reflected in its Statement, while 
perhaps well intentioned, are misdirected. The Statement reflects a 
reflexive, reactionary view of a potentially invaluable tool for combating 
climate change at a grassroots level. As established in this Note, well 
designed PACE programs do nothing to increase lenders’ risk; indeed, 
such evidence that exists shows just the opposite. Hopefully the FHFA can 
be convinced of the folly of its actions. If not, a legislative solution to the 
current PACE impasse would be ideal, but a judicial fix may be all that is 
feasible in the near future.
195
 Nevertheless, those with the power to enact 
 
 
 191. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The types, intensity, and duration of the effects 
of global warming are all subjects of fierce debate within the scientific community. See U.S. GLOBAL 
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), 
available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf. 
 192. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Global warming is the perfect example of the 
sort of phenomenon that is caused by such individually insignificant but cumulatively significant 
actions. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 
1216 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding an EA deficient because it failed to assess the cumulative impact of 
increased GHG emissions from the increased numbers of Mexican trucks that would be allowed into 
the United States under the proposed rule at issue). 
 194. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 195. At the time of this writing, a motion to dismiss one of the suits against the FHFA has been 
denied—the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a prima facie case in regards to their claim that the 
promulgation of the FHFA Statement violated the APA and NEPA, and the action was not barred by 
HERA because the FHFA was not acting as a conservator when it issued the Statement. The court also 
granted a preliminary injunction requiring the FHFA to begin the notice and comment process under 
the APA “relating to its policy on PACE-related debts.” Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, California v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 4:10-cv-03084-
CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011). But see Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Town of 
Babylon v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 2:10-cv-04916-LDW-ARL (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/4
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or implement PACE legislation should follow the best practice guidelines 
promulgated by the DOE even absent a legislative mandate to do so. By 
following these guidelines, it will be shown that PACE can be an effective 
tool for encouraging energy efficiency while remaining compatible with 
prudential lending practices. Moreover, as commercial PACE has 
continued unaffected by the FHFA’s actions, government regulators can 
look to it as an example for how residential PACE might be effectively 
structured. 
Climate change and dependence on fossil fuels represent two of the 
most pressing concerns our society faces today. Addressing these concerns 
will be a monumental task for decades to come. PACE represents 
innovative policymaking that attempts to address these concerns by 
encouraging efficient collective action. Such policymaking is precisely the 
kind of ingenuity that will be required in the coming years. Rather than 
putting roadblocks in the way of such policies, governments would be well 
advised to encourage such solutions by working together with other levels 
and agencies of government, private industry, and the public at large. It is 
to be hoped that the recent conflict surrounding PACE will be a mere 
speed bump along the road in our attempts to address and adapt to the 
potentially grave consequences of climate change. 
Jeffrey Hoops
 
 
2011) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims against the FHFA because HERA 
divests jurisdiction when the agency is acting as a conservator, and the FHFA was acting in that role 
when it issued its Statement); Order of Dismissal, Leon County v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
No. 4:10-cv-00436-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2011) (same); Order Granting Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss, NRDC v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, No. 1:10-cv-07647-SAS (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 
2011) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction both because the FHFA was acting as conservator 
under HERA and because the NRDC lacked standing). In response to the preliminary injunction issued 
by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the FHFA issued an Advanced 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning PACE and a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS regarding 
the potential environmental impacts of PACE pursuant to NEPA. Mortgage Assets Affected by PACE 
Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 3958 (proposed Jan. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1254). The 
FHFA sought comment on “whether the restrictions and conditions set forth in the July 6, 2010 
Statement . . . should be maintained, changed, or eliminated, and whether other restrictions should be 
imposed. Id. The FHFA has also appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, and that 
appeal is pending at the time of this writing. Id. 
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